

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**  
**Newport, R.I.**

**Joint Force Air Component Commander:  
Transitioning from Afloat to Ashore**


by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## Abstract of


### Joint Force Air Component Commander: Transitioning from Afloat to Ashore

The Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) mission is to command joint air operations based on the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) concept of operations and air apportionment decisions. This is accomplished by planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of assets. The basic components of the JFACC organization are Combat Plans, Combat Operations, Intelligence, and Communications. The Combat Plans Division includes a Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting (GAT) Cell, an Air Tasking Order (ATO) Production Cell, and an Air Strategy Cell. The Combat Operations Division includes Current Operations, an Airspace Cell, and an Air Defense Cell. The preceding JFACC organizational functions and relationships have been captured in joint doctrine. The JFACC charter is flexible. It could operate as part of a naval enabling force conducting presence operations. On the other end of the spectrum, it might participate in a major regional conflict. This paper will focus on the sea-based JFACC. It will explore the problems, limitations and considerations faced by sea-based JFACC. This will be done by illustrating the sea-based JFACC variations that have been developed. Once a picture has been developed of the afloat JFACC executing its mission, the following question will be presented and analyzed: once a crisis matures, how do you smoothly accomplish a transition to the next higher or lower echelon of joint air operations? The discussion will attempt to show that joint doctrine has not completely addressed this question.

## PREFACE

The concepts of JFACC and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) have experienced similar historical development. They are both relatively old concepts. In the case of MOOTW, the United States has been conducting operations other than war for over 150 years, while JFACCs roots extend back to World War II. They have both undergone significant changes in their execution methods over history. Finally, they have both received major doctrinal changes in the last decade. Contingency operations evolved into Low Intensity Conflict which later matured into MOOTW. JFACC has experienced similar changes, most notably since Desert Shield and Desert Storm where the U.S. military first conducted truly joint air operations.

These two topics are of particular interest because of their cognate relationship. MOOTW are now discussed as a spectrum of crises which intensify up to the point where war is occurring. JFACC has evolved similarly in order to match up



**Figure 1- JFACC Spectrum**

to mission objectives (See figure 1).<sup>1</sup> This evolution has also been the engine for driving sea-based JFACC development. Further discussion of this linkage to MOOTW is beyond the scope of this paper. However, MOOTW is identified here

<sup>1</sup> Frietas, Marc E. And Thomas A. Parker, JFACC--A common sense approach, 1994, p19.

as a key consideration when discussing JFACC, particularly sea-based JFACC, because the spectrum of operations, in many cases, favors the use of the sea-based option.

The focus of this paper is simply to identify the hurdles that lie in the path of a sea-based JFACC that must now transition ashore during an operation. The challenge will be to highlight the shortfalls of joint doctrine and propose changes to update Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

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## **Joint Force Air Component Commander: Transitioning from Afloat to Ashore**

Currently, inadequate joint doctrinal information has been published on the sea-based JFACC. Moreover, existing discussions on transitioning the JFACC are incomplete because of this lack of information. This report will provide an overview of the JFACC, will illustrate the development of the sea-based JFACC, and will address challenges of transitioning the sea-based JFACC to shore. Issues will be captured in a proposed change to joint doctrine based on these discussions.

### **Introduction**

In the event of a crisis situation, a Joint Task Force (JTF) would be activated by the regional Commander in Chief (CINC) or potentially by the Secretary of Defense. The JTF commander exercises operational control (OPCON) over assigned forces.<sup>2</sup> The JFC will typically be assigned subordinate commanders from each service component. However, the JFC will also assign several functional component commanders, e.g., the JFACC or the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC).<sup>3</sup> The JFACC's mission is to "exploit the capabilities of joint air operations through a cohesive joint air operations plan and a responsive. . . control system" based on the JFC's concept of operations and air apportionment decisions.<sup>4</sup> This is accomplished by planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of assets.<sup>5</sup> Because it is a functional command, other component commanders would make air assets available to the JFACC for tasking in support of the JFC's objectives. Direct support

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<sup>2</sup> Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations provides a detailed discussion for establishment of the JTF and command relations, pII-13.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pII-15.


<sup>4</sup> Joint Pub 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, Nov 1994, p.vi.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pII-2.

sorties retained by components must comply with directives in the joint air operations plan, e.g., airspace control measures, special instructions (SPINS), and rules of engagement (ROE).

### ***JFACC Organization***

The basic components of the JFACC organization are Combat Plans, Combat Operations, Intelligence, and Communications (See Figure 2). The JFACC may also be assigned responsibilities as airspace control authority (ACA), area air defense commander (AADC), or the joint search and rescue coordinator (JSRC).



**Figure 2 - Notional JFACC Organization**

The Combat Plans Division formulates the air plan strategy. It ascertains the best match of target, weapon and asset, keeping in mind the JFC's objectives. Combat Plans includes the Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting (GAT) Cell, an Air Task Order (ATO) Production Cell, and an Air Strategy Cell. The GAT Cell, working in conjunction with the Intelligence Division, matches nominated targets with available air assets. The ATO Production Cell builds the master air attack plan from which the ATO, SPINS, and standardized messages for the JTF are generated. The Air Strategy Cell distills guidance from the JFC into prioritization and apportionment instructions for GAT and ATO Cells.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> NWP 3-56.1 JFACC Organization and Processes provides detailed discussions on the Combat Plans Division in Chapter 2, Appendix A, and Appendix B.



The Combat Operations Division executes the current day joint air operations plan in the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). It includes a Current Operations Cell, an Airspace Cell, and an Air Defense Cell. The Current Operations Cell coordinates and monitors scheduled assets, and adjusts the ATO as required. The Airspace Cell controls ACA procedures. The Air Defense Cell monitors and directs forces as air defense postures change.<sup>7</sup>

The Intelligence and Communications Divisions, while in supporting roles, are critical to the execution of the ATO. The Intelligence Division, in addition to information collection, contributes to the targeting process and battle damage assessments, while the Communications Division maintains complex command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) equipment.

***Where will the JFACC operate?***

The JFACC charter is flexible. It could operate as a part of a naval enabling force, conducting presence operations. On the other end of the spectrum, it might participate in a major regional conflict. Thus, the choices that a JFC must make in designating the JFACC are capability driven. In crises of varying intensity, the tempo of expected air operations dictates where the JFACC should be located. Medium to high intensity joint air operations require a land-based JFACC, whereas peace to medium intensity operations could be sea-based. The responsiveness of available forces may drive the answer. Sea-based forces, by virtue of being forward deployed around the world, are in a position to “quickly transition from forward operations to

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<sup>7</sup> NWP 3-56.1 provides detailed discussions on the Combat Ops Division in Chapter 2, Appendix A, and Appendix B.

contingency operations.”<sup>8</sup> Of course, in considering response times and capability, an available carrier battle group (CVBG) with an amphibious ready group (ARG) could act as a naval enabling force with a sea-based JFACC as a short term solution. Then, as additional forces become available to the JFC, the JFACC could transition to shore for higher tempo operations, for the medium to long term solution.

### ***Conclusions***

In summary, not every joint operation will require a JFACC, e.g., various peace operations, humanitarian assistance, or air strikes/raids. The JFC will decide if a JFACC is required based on the intensity and type of operation. The increasing frequency of U.S. participation in MOOTW is significant to the JFACC. It requires the tailoring of the JFACC to the specific mission and expected level of conflict. The notional JFACC organization is now captured in doctrine. The key challenge when building the JFACC is tailoring manning requirements to meet mission objectives while maintaining flexibility in the event the crisis situation changes. Finally, the JFC must decide on the optimum location for the JFACC headquarters, particularly sea-based versus land-based options. As previously illustrated, the type of operation, availability of forces, and desired response time are all factors in this decision.

### **Sea-based JFACC**

#### ***A Historical Perspective***

The Navy, since World War II, has massed significant experience at carrier-based air operations and planning. A significant portion of these operations were Navy only. Thus, there was a sea-based Navy force air component commander (NFACC).

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p3-1.

With the execution of Operation Eldorado Canyon against Libya, the division of labor was mostly Navy with a little bit of Air Force participation. The sea-based NFACC was again the planning and execution tool. Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm mark a significant point in JFACC development because, for the first time, multiple Service air assets operated together under the control of a joint staff using predominantly Air Force procedures. Since then, the Navy has made great strides in evolving sea-based JFACC capability from the NFACC. Carrier-based and Amphibious Command Ship (LCC) based JFACC concepts have been developed into employable options for the JFC. Ocean Venture 93 and Tandem Thrust 93 represent the Navy's initial efforts at operating the LCC-based JFACC Staff. By 1994, the Navy's JFACC initiative focused on staffing specifically for operations from an aircraft carrier. The concept was coined the 'Fly-away JFACC' because it targeted one East and one West coast Carrier Group that would maintain a cadre of trained personnel ready to 'fly-away' to an emerging crisis. These were Carrier Group Four (Atlantic) and Carrier Group One (Pacific), which were also incidentally the Fleet training commands that prepare carrier battle groups for deployment. The fly-away JFACC became a debated issue due to the significant training and formal education requirements that would have to be completed and maintained. Additionally, there were new intelligence-intensive C4I requirements needed to support the CV-based JFACC.

Sea-based JFACC was introduced in doctrine in 1995. Coupled with the January promulgation of Test Publication Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56.1 JFACC

Organization and Processes by Naval Document Command, was the release of Joint Pub 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, which introduced the sea-based JFACC concept. Additionally, several major exercises occurred which tested the CV and LCC-based JFACCs. As a result, every theater-level exercise that employs a JFACC, e.g., Tandem Thrust, Ulchi Focus Lense, and Unified Endeavor, has attempted to execute joint air operations with a sea-based JFACC.

Finally, simultaneous development of standardized C4I installations for the CVN and LCC has occurred. The experience gained from each joint exercise has imparted some improvement on the capability of ships to host the JFACC. This evolution continues today in the Fleet training of CVBGs as Level One JFACCs in the deployment workup process.

### ***Sea-Based JFACC Options***

The afloat JFACC could be either of two basic types: the LCC-based JFACC or CV-based JFACC. Three specific afloat options are available to the JFC, and they are discerned by varying "levels" of capability.<sup>9</sup>

- A level One JFACC is that option staffed from within a carrier battle group. It has the capability to plan and execute air operations for one CVBG, an ARG, and one Air Force Wing.
- A Level Two JFACC is staffed by a combination of 40 to 50 augmentees, as well as personnel from within the CVBG. It has the capability to execute air operations for two CVBGs, one ARG, and one Air Force Wing.

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<sup>9</sup> Odgen, Odie, MAJ, USMC, COMSECONDFLT J34, telephone interview 22 Jan 97.

- Level Three, the LCC-based JFACC, consists of approximately 130 personnel (about one-third U.S. Navy and two-thirds from other Services).<sup>10</sup> The Level Three JFACC can handle planning and execution for two to three CVBGs, one to two ARGs with Marine Aviation Wings (MAW), and two Air Force Wings. It would be considered somewhat less responsive than a CVBG because LCCs do not normally deploy.

There is a Level Four JFACC option within the Navy model and it is the land-based JFACC case.<sup>11</sup> It can plan and execute air operations for 3 to 5 CVBGs, two ARGs, and three to four Air Force Wings. Of note, the JFACC capability discussed above was not presented in terms of sortie rates. This is a departure from previous experience where JFACC capability was measured in terms of sorties per day.

#### ***Sea-based JFACC Organization***

The three sea-based JFACC options described above have significantly different manning processes. These differences have considerable impact on the availability of naval air assets to the JFACC and ultimately sortie generation rate. The two CV-based JFACC options employ approximately 80 personnel. The Level One case builds the JFACC Staff from the CVBG Staff, the embarked Air Wing Staff and the CV/CVN. The Level Two JFACC employs a core JFACC Staff manned by approximately 40 reservists and is supplemented by a 40 additional personnel from the CVBG. In the latter case, the JFACC Commander, Deputy Commander and Assistant Chiefs of Staff are staffed from the reserve pool. This reserve unit of

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<sup>10</sup> Ströberg, Eric, LTC, USAF, NAVDOCCOM N5, Norfolk, VA, telephone interview 16 Jan 97.

<sup>11</sup> Odgen, Odie, MAJ, USMC, COMSECONDFLT J34, interview 23 Jan 97; and NWP 3-56.1,p3-2.

JFACC trained officers is currently being assembled by Commander, Second Fleet in Norfolk Va.<sup>12</sup> The Level Three, LCC-based, JFACC is composed of approximately 130 augmentees including component liaison officers (LNO), a Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE), and representatives from participating air commands.


- *Level One JFACC.* As previously mentioned, the Level One case utilizes personnel from the CVBG Staff, the embarked Air Wing Staff and the CV/CVN.

The concern in doing so is that strike planners, air defense planners, current operations watchstanders, etc., are provided from the pool of pilots within the carrier air wing (CVW). The tradeoff becomes that of planning versus flying. The overall impact is seen in the reduction in sortie generation and combat readiness. A similar manning issue arises when taking personnel from the CVBG Staff, the Destroyer Squadron Staff (DESRON), and CV ship's company. The immediate effect would be that each of these staffs holds down CVBG warfare commander responsibilities, e.g., Air Warfare Commander, Surface Warfare Commander, Command and Control Warfare Commander, and numerous others. These roles are critical to the functions of protection, fires, and maneuver. The challenge of the Level One JFACC is to be able to support JFC objectives without significantly degrading other capabilities of the CVBG. Figure 3 shows a notional Level One JFACC. A proposed billet assignment matrix is provided in Appendix A of NWP 3-56.1 for JFACC division directors from the officer population within the CVBG.

- *Level Two JFACC.* The Level Two JFACC has completely different manning

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<sup>12</sup> Hornstein, Dan, LT, USN, COMSECONDFLT J34, interview 22 Jan 97.




**Figure 3 - Notional Level One JFACC Organization**

issues from the Level One case, although both are CV-based. Because approximately 40 reservists, the fly-away JFACC, are employed, now only about 40 CVBG personnel are now required to supplement the JFACC. As expected, the increase in capability in the Level Two JFACC is reflected in manning increases in the Combat Operations Division and the Combat Plans Division. The overall impact of the Level Two JFACC imparts two general changes over its predecessor. The impact on the CVBG Staff and DESRON Staff is essentially removed, and the impact on the CVW Staff and subordinate squadron staffs is reduced. The impact on the CV ship's company in the form of communications support and CV Intelligence Center (CVIC) support is unchanged. Figure 4 and Table 1 illustrate the Level Two JFACC.<sup>13</sup>

- *Level Three JFACC.* As identified earlier, the Level Three, LCC-based JFACC, consists of approximately 130 personnel and is geared to a much higher tempo of air

<sup>13</sup> Notional reserve Fly-Away JFACC augmentation plan provided by LT Dan Hornstein, USN, COMSECONDFLT J34, 22 Jan 97.




**Figure 4 - Notional Level Two JFACC Organization**

JFACC									
JFC1-01	JFACC	RADM	USNR	07					
DEPUTY JFACC									
JFC1-02	DJFACC	CAPT	USNR	06					
ADMIN CELL					PLANS				
JFC1-03	JFACC Director	CAPT	USNR	06	JFC5-01	ACOS PLANS	CDR	USNR	05
JFC1-04	ADMIN Officer	LT	USNR	03	JFC5-02	Long Rg Plans	LCDR	USNR	04
JFC1-05	JFACC SJA	LCDR	USNR	04	JFC5-03	Long Rg Plans	LCDR	USNR	04
INTEL CELL					GAT CELL				
JFC2-01	ACOS Intel	CDR	USNR	05	JFC5-04	GAT Cell Chief	CDR	USNR	05
JFC2-02	Combat Asst	LCDR	USNR	04	JFC5-05	TLAM Stk	LCDR	USNR	04
JFC2-03	Target Off/GAT	LCDR	USNR	04	JFC5-06	STW Plans F-18	LCDR	USNR	04
JFC2-04	Target Off/GAT	LCDR	USNR	04	JFC5-06	STW Plans F-16	LCDR	USNR	04
JFC2-05	RECCE	LT	USNR	03	JFC5-07	STW Plans F-14	LCDR	USNR	04
JFC2-06	C2/SIGINT	LT	USNR	03	JFC5-08	C2W Plans	LT	USNR	03
OPS CELL					JFC5-09	Planner FTR	LT	USNR	03
JFC3-01	ACOS OPS	CAPT	USNR	06	JFC5-10	AWACS Plans	CAPT	USAFR	03
JFC3-02	OPS Chief Day	CDR	USNR	05	Air Defense				
JFC3-03	OPS Chief Night	CDR	USNR	05	JFC5-11	Air Defense Chief	CDR	USNR	05
JFC3-04	STW OPS	LCDR	USNR	04	JFC5-12	Air Defense/E-2	LT	USNR	03
JFC3-05	CAS OPS	LT	USNR	03	JFC5-13	Air Defense/Aegis	LT	USNR	03
JFC3-06	Tanker OPS	CAPT	USAF	03	JFC5-14	Air Defense FTR	LT	USNR	03
JFC3-07	Fighter OPS	LT	USNR	03	ATO				
AIRSPACE CELL					PRODUCTION				
JFC4-01	ACOS Airspace	CDR	USNR	05	JFC5-15	ATO Prod Chief	LCDR	USNR	04
JFC4-02	Airspace Mngr	OSCS	USNR	E8	JFC5-16	Fragger / GAT	LCDR	USNR	04
JFC4-03	Airspace Mngr	ACS	USNR	E7	JFC5-17	Fragger / GAT	LCDR	USNR	04
LIASON CELL					JFC5-18	ALLOREQ / DS	LT	USNR	03
JFL-01	CJTF LNO	CDR	JTF	05	JFC5-19	HELO / DS	LT	USNR	03
JFL-02	CJTF LNO	LT	JTF	03	JFC5-20	SPINS Coord	LT	USNR	03
JFL-03	SOLE	LCDR	SOC	04	JFC5-21	Tanker Coord	LCDR	USNR	04
JFL-04	SOLE	LT	SOC	03	JFC5-22	CTAPS Oper	OS2	USNR	E5
					JFC5-23	CTAPS Oper	OS2	USNR	E5

**Table 1 - Level Two JFACC Reserve Fly-Away Augmentation**



operations. The increase in personnel over the Level Two JFACC is seen in a larger Intelligence Division, larger Combat Plans Division (GAT and ATO Production Cells), and significant number of liaison elements, e.g., component LNOs, participating air command representatives, and a BCE. The overall result of transitioning to a Level Three JFACC results in the removal of a majority of the Level One and Two obligations from the CVBG. However, the CVBG would still be expected to provide LNOs and conduct supporting air operations. Another product of advancing to the Level Three JFACC is that the target coordination function would now belong to the JTCB. It would be staffed from all components as opposed to the Navy in the Level One and Two case. The Level Three JFACC is depicted in Figure 5 and detailed manning considerations are provided in NWP 3-56.1.<sup>14</sup>



**Figure 5 - Notional Level Three JFACC Organization**

<sup>14</sup> NWP 3-56.1, Appendix A.

### ***Afloat JFACC Conclusions***

After describing the Navy's historical operations as an NFACC, the detailed discussions on Level One and Two JFACC above illustrate that they are essentially still NFACCs with joint capability. The manning challenges of the three sea-based options are considerable but have been formulated into workable plans. While C4I requirements have only been touched on, the experience from the battery of major exercises where afloat JFACC is employed has continued to improve the LCC and CV/CVN C4I equipment installations.

### ***Sea-based JFACC Doctrine***

The first challenge would be to have a doctrinally supported and properly sized sea-based JFACC Staff. The object of this endeavor would be to refine joint doctrinal publications to include discussions on capabilities, limitations, and headquarters considerations for the afloat JFACC. The goal should be to enable *any* Service, if assigned, to properly stand up the sea-based JFACC based on the platform available and the number of air forces participating in the operation. By capturing the sea-based JFACC in joint doctrine, it will enable further refinement of procedures, all-Service understanding, and continued improvement by testing these concepts in exercises and operations. C4I installations and manning frameworks for each level of sea-based JFACC, and associated ship type (LCC, CV/CVN) should be provided in joint doctrine. Moreover, staff beddown constraints and ship assets/personnel that will be dedicated to the sea-based JFACC should also be identified along with supporting arguments in order to foster joint understanding.

Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56.1 has made great strides in capturing the sea-based JFACC. However, the lack of detailed joint doctrine still exists. As a result, military Services other than the Navy are at a disadvantage when trying to understand, plan, and operate with a sea-based JFACC.

### **Sea-Based JFACC Transition to Shore**

The preceding sections have introduced the sea-based JFACC and identified its capabilities. The questions posed are: (1) why transition the JFACC, and (2) how can a transition be accomplished smoothly?

Transitioning has two very different actions associated with sea-based JFACC. In one case, the JFACC could transition in capability, in response to either higher or lower tension in a crisis. Transitioning in capability does not necessarily require the JFACC to change its headquarters and JAOC location, e.g., in the case of a shift from Level One to Level Two JFACC, since both are CV-based. In the other case, the JFACC is transitioning based on location. This may be required due to movement of the JFC's staff, an operational requirement to shift, or once again, a change in the required capability. In dissecting the second argument further, movement of the JFC's staff may oblige the JFACC to also move in order to maintain close liaison for mission execution. Secondly, several operational requirements may force the JFACC to shift its location, e.g., battle damage to the host ship, failure or degradation of critical C4I systems that impacts JFACC execution, excessive distance from the area of operations by being limited to a sea-based headquarters, or simply the host platform being required to respond to another

unrelated crisis. Finally, the exceeding of JFACC capability by the growth of joint air operations would potentially require a shift in the JFACC's headquarters based on the new level of capability required.

So when the question "why transition the JFACC" is asked, joint air operations requirements are obviously at the top of the list. However, other considerations come into play, e.g., expected length of the operation, effort/cost required to establish a shore-based headquarters, security, sustainment, future protection requirements, and perceived operational gain. The JFC must look at the whole picture and weigh risks versus gains, when deciding to transition the JFACC.

The second question posed was "how can a transition be accomplished smoothly?" The idea of the JFACC having inherent flexibility has been introduced. A portion of this flexibility must be in its ability to respond to crises of varying intensity. However, the sea-based JFACC must also be ready to transition in capability or location. A key constraint to the transition is that the C4I equipment installed on the host ship is normally fixed in place and cannot be moved. Thus, this is no small task. It requires well thought out plans which cover all cases. Joint Pub 3-56.1 suggests that two transition scenarios exist: a planned transition, and an unplanned transition.<sup>15</sup> The planned transition would encompass, for example, sea-based JFACC shifts due to a required increase in capability, a shift of JFC's Staff, or excessive distance from the area of operations. Unplanned transitions are those beyond the control of planners such as battle damage to host ship, C4I system failures, or reassignment of the host platform to another crisis. Designation of an

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<sup>15</sup> Joint Publication 3-56.1, pII-9.

Alternate JFACC is essential to either transition option. In the planned transition, the Alternate JFACC can monitor execution of the new primary JFACC. If possible, the previous (sea-based) JFACC is the best candidate because it would still have the C4I equipment to do so. The Alternate JFACC is more crucial in the unplanned transition. It may be forced to assume full JFACC duties in the event of a prolonged loss of the JFACC, or it may assume partial duties as in the case of failure of C4I equipment or battle damage which degrades JFACC capability. The unplanned transition is not expected to be smooth. However, detailed planning by the JFACC in the form of preplanned responses could result in a seamless transition.

### ***Methods of Transitioning***

- *Relief of the JFACC.* An obvious means of accomplishing the seamless JFACC shift without interruption is to simply have the JFACC relieved by a replacement staff in the new location.<sup>16</sup> This requires the assembly of a separate staff and the establishment of a new headquarters, JAOC, and habitability facilities. A transition period would be set up to systematically update planning functions, equipment databases, and airspace control and air defense operations. The Alternate JFACC would monitor execution of the new JFACC once in place. This plays out as the least risk but highest cost option. This option would be required for a transition from the Level One JFACC in that its staff was constituted from CVBG personnel.
- *Phased transition.* The major difference between the phased transition and its predecessor is that the requirement for an entirely new JFACC staff is removed.

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<sup>16</sup> The relief of JFACC is the only transition option considered by Joint Pub 3-56.1. The phased transition should also be considered for Level Two and Three sea-based JFACCs.

The JFACC would incrementally shift to its new headquarters over a predetermined period of time while being monitored by the Alternate JFACC.<sup>17</sup> As a result, this option only applies to the Level Two or Level Three sea-based JFACC, however, the Level Two staff would require additional augmentation to replace the CVBG personnel left behind. While the risk in this option is somewhat increased, gain is realized in continuity by keeping the original JFACC leadership and organization.

### ***JFACC Transitioning Doctrine***

The discussions presented in the preceding sections on transitioning the JFACC are barely touched upon in joint doctrine. Again, the goal should be to promote a basic all-Service understanding of all of the considerations that go into a JFACC transition. At a minimum, other Services should be aware of the above limitations because they might be tasked to function as the JFACC or Alternate JFACC during a transition.

### ***JFACC Transitioning Conclusions***

Joint Pub 3-56.1 does not present an adequate discussion on transitioning the JFACC. The discussion provided and associated considerations are not comprehensive. Improvements in the transition discussion in Joint Pub 3-56.1 are required. A proposed change to Joint Pub 3-56.1, addressing sea-based JFACC and JFACC transitioning, is provided as an attachment to this report.

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<sup>17</sup> A detailed formulation for a phased transition is presented in NWP 3-56.1 Chapter 3, however, it does not discuss which types of sea-based JFACCs can conduct this proposed option.

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**Cover-Letter for Proposed Change to Joint Pub 3-56.1**

7 February, 1997

From: LCDR William D. Orton, USN

To: Joint War Fighting Center/Doctrine Division  
Fenwick Rd, Bldg 96  
Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000  
Attn: Doctrine Division

Subj: Proposed Change to Joint Pub 3-56.1, dated 14 November 1994

Ref: (a) Joint Pub 3-56.1  
(b) Phoncon with MAJ Dean Marvin, USMC, Joint Warfighting Center,  
23 January 1997

Encl: (1) Comments on Joint Pub 3-56.1

1. As discussed in references (a) and (b), a review was conducted on subject document. The enclosed comments should be considered in conjunction with comments provided by Commander, Second Fleet review of Joint Pub 3-56.1.
2. This review was conducted in conjunction with the development of a Joint Military Operations Department paper which addressed sea-based JFACC and the need for joint doctrine to better address the transitioning process.
3. Point of contact for review of Joint Pub 3-56.1 is LCDR Bill Orton, who can be contacted at COMM (401) 841 3373, DSN 948-3373, or FAX 948-3804.

W.D. Orton  
LCDR USN

## COMMENTS ON JOINT PUB 3-56.1

### MAJOR COMMENTS

#### 1. General Comments:

A. Sea-Based JFACC. The first challenge would be to have a doctrinally supported and properly sized sea-based JFACC Staff. The object of this endeavor would be to refine joint doctrinal publications to include discussions on capabilities, limitations, and headquarters considerations for the afloat JFACC. The goal should be to enable *any* Service, if assigned, to properly stand up the sea-based JFACC based on the platform available for its headquarters and the number of air forces participating in the operation.

The Navy has made great progress in developing the sea-based Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept. To date, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56.1 has been promulgated with an informative discussion on three different afloat JFACC options. Additionally, the concept has been tested in a battery of Theater and Fleet level joint exercises in order to ensure a workable model was designed.

The current information in Joint Pub 3-56.1 provides no discussion on afloat capabilities based on ship type, staff limitations, communications equipment available, or intelligence support available for targeting and strike planning. It introduces the notion of a sea-based JFACC but does not provide adequate detail. The afloat JFACC could be either of two basic types: the LCC-based JFACC or CV-based JFACC. Three specific afloat options are available to the JFC. A level One JFACC is that option staffed from within a carrier battle group. A Level Two JFACC is staffed by a combination of 40 to 50 augmentees and personnel from the CVBG. Level Three, the LCC-based JFACC consists of approximately 130 personnel (about one-third U.S. Navy and two-thirds from other services). Specific capabilities and limitations are presented in detail within NWP 3-56.1.

As prescribed above, the sea-based JFACC needs to be better captured in Joint doctrine. This enables formalization of procedures, all-Service understanding, and fosters future improvement by testing these concepts in exercises and operations. C4I installations and manning frameworks for each level of sea-based JFACC, and associated ship type (LCC, CV/CVN) should also be provided in joint doctrine. Moreover, staff beddown constraints and ship assets/personnel that will be dedicated to the sea-based JFACC should also be identified along with supporting arguments in order to foster joint understanding. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56.1 has made great strides in capturing the sea-based JFACC. However, the lack of detailed joint doctrine still exists. As a result, military Services other than the Navy are at a disadvantage when trying to understand, plan, and operate with a sea-based JFACC. Since a lack of adequate discussion on sea-based JFACC exists within joint doctrine, specifically Joint Pub 3-56.1, this information should be included as a baseline from which other Services could plan for joint operations.

B. JFACC Transitioning. Joint Pub 3-56.1 has introduced the notion of transitioning a JFACC between locations and provided a basic diagram listing general considerations for conducting a transition, however, the reader is left with many questions. The questions posed are: (1) why transition the JFACC, and (2) how can a transition be accomplished smoothly?

***Transitioning***

Transitioning has two very different actions associated with sea-based JFACC. In one case, the JFACC could transition in capability in response to either higher or lower tension in a crisis. Transitioning in capability does not necessarily require the JFACC to change its headquarters and JAOC location, e.g., in the case of a shift from Level One to Level Two JFACC, since both are CV-based. In the other case, the JFACC is transitioning based on location. This may be required due to movement of the JFC's staff, an operational requirement to shift, or once again, a change in the required capability. In dissecting the second argument further, movement of the JFC's staff may oblige the JFACC to also move in order to maintain close liaison for mission execution. Secondly, several operational requirements may force the JFACC to shift its location, e.g., battle damage to the host ship, failure or degradation of critical C4I systems that impacts JFACC execution, excessive distance from the area of operations by being limited to a sea-based headquarters, or simply the host platform being required to respond to another unrelated crisis. Finally, the exceeding of JFACC capability by the growth of joint air operations would potentially require a shift in the JFACC's headquarters based on the new level of capability required.

So when the question "why transition the JFACC" is asked, joint air operations requirements are obviously at the top of the list. However, other considerations come into play, e.g., expected length of the operation, effort/cost required to establish a shore-based headquarters, security, sustainment, future protection requirements, and perceived operational gain. The JFC must look at the whole picture and weigh risks versus gains in deciding to transition the JFACC.

The second question posed was "how can a transition be accomplished smoothly?" The idea of the JFACC having inherent flexibility has been introduced. A portion of this flexibility must be in its ability to respond to crises of varying intensity. However, the sea-based JFACC must also be ready to transition in capability or location. A key constraint to the transition is that the C4I equipment installed on the host ship is normally fixed in place and cannot be moved. Thus, this is no small task. It requires well thought out plans which cover all cases. Joint Pub 3-56.1 suggests that two transition scenarios exist: a planned transition, and an unplanned transition. The planned transition would encompass, for example, sea-based JFACC shifts due to a required increase in capability, a shift of JFC's Staff, or excessive distance from the area of operations. Unplanned transitions are those beyond the control of planners such as battle damage to host ship, C4I system failures, or reassignment of the host platform to another crisis. Designation of an Alternate JFACC is essential to either transition option. In the planned transition, the Alternate JFACC can monitor execution of the new primary JFACC. If possible, the previous (sea-based) JFACC is the best candidate because it would still have the C4I

equipment to do so. The Alternate JFACC is more crucial in the unplanned transition. It may be forced to assume full JFACC duties in the event of a prolonged loss of the JFACC, or it may assume partial duties as in the case of failure of C4I equipment or battle damage which degrades JFACC capability. The unplanned transition is not expected to be smooth, however, detailed planning by the JFACC in the form of preplanned responses could result in a seamless transition.

#### ***Methods of Transitioning***

- *Relief of the JFACC.* An obvious means of accomplishing the seamless JFACC shift without interruption is to simply have the JFACC relieved by a replacement staff in the new location. This requires the assembly of a separate staff and the establishment of a new headquarters, JAOC, and habitability facilities. A transition period would be set up to systematically update planning functions, equipment databases, and airspace control and air defense operations. The Alternate JFACC would monitor execution of the new JFACC once in place. This plays out as the least risk but highest cost option. This option would be required for a transition from the Level One JFACC in that its staff was constituted from CVBG personnel.
- *Phased transition.* The major difference between the phased transition and its predecessor is that the requirement for an entirely new JFACC staff is removed. The JFACC would incrementally shift to its new headquarters over a predetermined period of time while being monitored by the Alternate JFACC. As a result, this option only applies to the Level Two or Level Three sea-based JFACC, however, the Level Two staff would require additional augmentation to replace the CVBG personnel left behind. While the risk in this option is somewhat increased, gain is realized in continuity by keeping the original JFACC leadership and organization.

#### ***JFACC Transitioning Doctrine***

The discussions presented in the preceding sections on transitioning the JFACC are barely touched upon in joint doctrine. Again, the goal should be to promote a basic all-Service understanding of all of the considerations that go into a JFACC transition. At a minimum, other Services should be aware of the above limitations because they might be tasked to function as the JFACC or Alternate JFACC during a transition.

Joint Pub 3-56.1 does not present an adequate discussion on transitioning the JFACC. The discussion provided and associated considerations are not comprehensive. Improvements in the transition discussion in Joint Pub 3-56.1 are required.

#### **SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS**

##### **1. Specific Comments:**

A. Page viii, second paragraph. Add the following paragraph before "Senior Component Liaisons . . .": "Assignment of a JFACC ashore or a sea-based JFACC must be considered. Two Carrier Battle Group based JFACC options are available to the JFC in the event an enabling force is desired. Also, an Amphibious

Command Ship (LCC) option exists, however, it will likely require additional time for the ship to transit to the Joint Operations Area. These sea-based options are described in detail in Appendix D.”

REASON: It provides an overview of sea-based JFACC options within the Executive Summary.

B. Page 1-3, subparagraph 4. Add the following: “Even more challenging may be when a range of tension and conflict occurs. For example, when MOOTW escalates to war and then transitions back to MOOTW in the post-hostilities phase. The potential to execute operations at any level along the conflict continuum requires flexibility and responsiveness of the JFACC in order to meet mission objectives.

REASON: The existing discussion presents MOOTW as being distinctly separate from armed conflict. In reality, MOOTW are likely to occur in the build up to hostilities and the de-escalation following conflict.

C. Page II-2, subparagraph 2. Add the following: “In the case of a rapidly developing contingency, the JFC may assign one component as the JFACC and transition these responsibilities to another component or command once additional forces have arrived in the AOR/JOA.”

REASON: The requirement for the capability to transition JFACC responsibilities should be introduced early in the chapter because it will be explored in detail in later discussions.

D. Page II-3, subparagraph 4. Add the following: “k. Establishing the optimum location for the JFACC and JAOC and planning for potential transitions to other components or commands, new locations, or back to the JTF Staff as required by the situation.”

REASON: Planning for the potential transition of JFACC responsibilities is identified as a JFACC requirement in several locations in JP 3-56.1 and should be included in the “JFACC responsibilities” discussion.

E. Page II-4, subparagraph 5. Change as follows: “Joint Pub 3-52, ‘Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone,’ provides further guidance on the AADC and ACA responsibilities across the full spectrum of military operations.”

REASON: Joint Pub 3-52 also includes MOOTW within its charter. This serves to introduce a later discussion in subparagraph 5.c.

F. Page II-8, subparagraph 9.b. Add the following:

- “- when the political or diplomatic situation requires minimized U.S. Military presence in the host country,
- when JTF air forces must be based outside the host country causing a reduced aircraft availability.”

REASON: Several permutations in MOOTW exist that may be favorable to sea-basing the JFACC as opposed to land-basing it some distance from the JOA. There are probably several other bullets that should be added here.

G. Page II-9, Subparagraph 9. Add the following: “c. **Sea-based JFACC options.** Three sea-based JFACC models have been developed:

- Level One (CV-based). The JFACC is staffed entirely within an available CVBG. It has the capability to plan and execute operations for one CVBG, one ARG, and one Air Force Wing.

- Level Two (CV-based). This option is staffed by a combination of augmentees and personnel from the CVBG. It has the capability to handle up to two CVBGs, one ARG, and one Air Force Wing.

- Level Three (LCC-based). The JFACC is staffed by approximately 130 personnel. It is capable of planning and executing operations for up to three CVBGs, two ARGs, and two Air Force Wings.

REASON: This is an appropriate place to introduce the sea-based JFACC options.

H. Page II-9, subparagraph 9.c. Change as follows: “Frequent ~~backup and~~ exchange of data bases, air operations planning tools, and future plans between the JFACC and Alternate JFACC is essential . . .”

REASON: Exchange of more than just ATO/CTAPS data bases is required for a rapid transition when unplanned.

I. Appendix D. Add the following: Extract Appendix A from NWP 3-56.1, Joint Force Air Component Commander Organization and Processes, and add it as new Appendix D to JP 3-56.1 after making appropriate administrative corrections.

REASON: Appendix A to NWP 3-56.1 provides an excellent overview to each of the three levels of sea-based JFACC. This information would be useful to the JFC Staff, Component Commander Staffs, and supporting Service Staffs in understanding, planning and operating with a sea-based JFACC.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE COMMENTS

##### 1. Specific Comments:

A. Page vi, second paragraph. Change as follows: “Unity of effort, flexibility, centralized planning . . .”

REASON: Editorial. Flexibility is discussed in detail in the body of the text and should be introduced in the Executive Summary.

B. Page viii, third paragraph. Change as follows: “~~Assignment of a JFACC ashore, assignment of a sea-based JFACC, A JFACC transition~~ (including planned and unplanned transitions), . . .”

REASON: Editorial. Sea-based and ashore JFACC were moved to their own paragraph. See Substantive Comment 1A above.

C. Page ix, first paragraph. Change as follows: "...appropriate command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) . . ."

REASON: Editorial.

D. Page x, subparagraph 3. Change as follows: "Air Strategy Identification in a clearly defined statement states how . . ."

REASON: Editorial. The existing term "Strategy Identification" could be confused with the term "strategy determination" discussed in Joint Pub 5-0, pI-19, which occurs at the National Command Authorities (NCA) level. "Strategy identification" is more closely related to the term "Commander's Intent" from Joint Pub 3-0, however, it would be inappropriate to use this initial planning term in the joint air operations planning discussion.

E. Page xiii, second paragraph. Change as follows: ". . .or campaign plan requires unity of effort, flexibility, centralized planning . . ."

REASON: Editorial. Flexibility is discussed in detail in the body of the text and should be included in the Executive Summary conclusion.

F. Page II-8, subparagraph 9.b. Change as follows: "~~The JFACC should be sea-based~~ Consideration should be given to sea-basing the JFACC when any one of the following conditions are present."

REASON: Editorial. Additional conditions for sea-basing the JFACC are proposed in the Substantive Comments above. The proposed change adds gray scales to this otherwise black and white discussion. Thus, the introductory narrative requires modification.

G. Page II-9, subparagraph 9.c. Change as follows: "~~e. d. JFACC Transition.~~"

REASON: Editorial. New para 9.c added in Substantive Comment 1.G.

H. Page II-9, subparagraph 9.c. Change as follows: ". . .JFACC duties to another component, platform, or the JFC, if required . . ."

REASON: Editorial. This ensures all possible permutations of a "planned transition" are considered.

I. Page II-9, subparagraph 9.c. Change as follows: ". . .JFACC responsibilities is complete, ~~the component passing responsibilities~~ an Alternate JFACC should continue . . ."

REASON: The use of the Alternate JFACC is appropriate in ensuring JFACC operations are intact during any type of transition. The command or component relinquishing JFACC duties may be the best candidate for monitoring after a transition. However, there are several instances where this may not be

possible, e.g., when the host platform to the sea-based JFACC must respond to another crisis outside the JOA.

J. Page II-9, subparagraph 9.c. Change as follows: “Buildup, reduction, or relocation of forces . . .”

REASON: Editorial. Consideration must be given to the de-escalatory situation as well.

K. Page II-9, subparagraph 9.c. Change as follows: “. . . JFACC becomes unresponsive, ~~or~~ unreliable or out of service due to battle damage.”

REASON: Battle damage should be considered as one of the causes of a transition event.

L. Appendix D and E. Change as follows: Redesignate Appendix D as Appendix E and redesignate Appendix E as Appendix F.

REASON: New Appendix D was proposed in Substantive Comment 1.I above.